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This article presents bilateral international migration projections to 2050 based on a new 
methodology that takes into account the population growth both in countries of origin and 
countries of destination. To do this, the methodology used by Hanson and McIntosh (2016) 
to project the future migratory flows to a sample of OECD countries is generalised to all 
countries worldwide. The United Nations population growth forecasts are used as a basis for 
projecting future migratory flows. The main findings of the exercise indicate that the number 
of migrants is projected to increase from 2.8% of the world population in 2010 to around 
3.5% in 2050, as a result of the strong increase in migrants from India and sub-Saharan 
Africa. Against this background, and despite the slowdown in demographic growth in Latin 
America, the United States is expected to continue to receive high net immigration flows and 
to remain the country with the highest stock of immigrants globally, while continental Europe 
will post larger net immigration flows.
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The author of this article is Rodolfo Campos of the Associate Directorate General International Affairs.
Population projections are one of the essential ingredients for estimating the potential 
growth rates of economies. Ultimately, demographics and technological progress are the 
key determinants of growth in the long run. In turn, the changes in a country’s population 
are highly conditional upon migratory movements, incoming (immigration) and outgoing 
(emigration) alike. However, compared with the projections of changes in the native 
population, which can be made using birth and death rates that move with relative 
predictability, migration dynamics are more difficult to anticipate. Indeed, the assumptions 
habitually used to project migratory changes are usually relatively simplistic. For example, 
in the United Nations population projections (World Population Prospects) it is assumed 
that future migratory flows will hold constant at their current levels until 2050 and that then 
they will gradually decline to 50% of that figure by 2100.1 Eurostat, for its part, uses 
extrapolations of the past patterns of net migration in the short run and assumes that net 
migration between countries will converge linearly to zero in the long run.2 In Spain’s case, 
the National Statistics Institute (INE) assumes in its long-term population projections that 
the parameters that describe international migration hold constant at the last known 
value.3 The absence of a more sophisticated methodology, but one that is in turn readily 
and consistently applicable to a series of countries, makes the development of new forms 
of projecting global migratory patterns necessary. 
Against this background, this article sets out international migration projections to 2050 
made using a new methodology, developed in Campos (2017), on the basis of the work by 
Hanson and McIntosh (2016). These authors start with the idea that migration between 
two countries is essentially determined by the relative abundance of the labour factor in 
the two countries and that, moreover, there are other factors that come to bear, such as 
geographical distance, certain cultural characteristics (e.g. the same language or a 
common colonial past) and the differences in the standard of living between the two 
countries. Hanson and McIntosh apply that methodology to a sample of OECD countries; 
in this article, the analysis extends to the rest of the world, thereby including some of the 
countries that are sources of emigration at present and whose domestic demographic 
dynamics are rapidly changing. Formally, the projections are obtained as predictions of an 
estimated model that relates migratory flows to the characteristics habitually contemplated 
in the literature and to the difference in long-term population growth rates. 
One of the main findings is that, despite the slowdown in demographic growth in Latin 
America, the United States will remain subject to immigration pressures from other global 
regions. That runs counter to the prediction by Hanson and McIntosh based on a more 
limited sample of countries, which does not include countries of destination with a lower 
level of development.4 Also, the number of migrants globally is expected to increase from 
2.8% of the world population in 2010 to around 3.5% in 2050. From the standpoint of the 
source of migration, the regions that are most expected to contribute to the increase in 
Introduction 
1  See United Nations (2015).
2  See Eurostat (2017).
3  See INE (2015).
4  Hanson and McIntosh (2016) use a database that contains a broad set of countries of origin but only countries 
of destination that belong to the OECD.
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the number of international migrants are India and the sub-Saharan African countries. In 
these countries the high birth rates that would generate demographic pressures, and in 
turn lead to greater emigration, are forecast to hold in the future.
The second section of this article briefly describes the methodology used to make the 
projections and discusses their advantages and limitations. The third section sets out and 
discusses the findings obtained for the main world regions. Finally, the last section draws 
some brief conclusions. 
The methodology used to obtain the projections is based on the positive relationship 
observed between demographic pressure and migration: particularly numerous cohorts of 
workers who join a country’s labour market generate incentives for emigration to other 
countries. Also, a relative shortage of workers in countries of destination with low 
demographic growth rates attracts international immigrants [Hatton and Williamson 
(2003)]. Economic theory and empirical evidence indicate that migratory flows are also 
stronger between countries that are geographically close, share a language or have other 
factors in common [Anderson (1979, 2011)].
Starting with these premises, the article estimates an enlarged gravity equation that 
captures the relationship between the change in the bilateral emigration rate and various 
demographic and geographical variables. Specifically, the equation estimated is the 
following: 
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In this equation, mod represents the percentage of the population of the country of origin 
“o” that resides in the country of destination “d”. The variable Dmod refers to the change in 
that percentage over a decade. On the right-hand side of the equation, the explanatory 
variables ho and hd are, respectively, fixed effects by country of origin and of destination, 
i.e. they respectively capture characteristics of the countries of origin and of destination 
that are not observable and that do not change over time (e.g. climate, seismic activity, 
etc.). The expression (go – gd) measures the difference in population growth rates between 
the country of origin (go) and the country of destination (gd). Each of these rates is calculated 
as the growth of the size of the cohort with ages spanning from 0 to 14 in a period of four 
decades. No distinction is made between native and immigrant population. This variable 
is laggied by a decade in the regression6 to prevent a problem of inverse causality, since 
the total population will be the sum of the native population and net emigration. 
Also on the right-hand side of the equation is the relative GDP per capita between the 
country of origin and of destination, as a measure of the difference in the standard of living 
(or as a proxy of the difference in relative wages). This variable is also lagged – in this case 
by 30 years – to avoid a problem of inverse causality. The remaining variables, denoted ti, 
are measures of proximity or distance habitually used in gravity migration regressions, and 
which in this specification appear both individually and interacted with the difference in 
population growth rates (go – gd). Included among the distance variables are geographical 
distance (measured in kilometres between the most populated cities in each country) and 
Methodology for making 
international migration 
projections5
5  Details of the methodology used to make the forecasts are set out in Campos (2017).
6  That is to say, if Dmod refers to the change between 2000 and 2010, then the difference in growth rates (go – gd) 
will be constructed on the basis of population growth rates between 1950 and 1990. 
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cultural distance (proxied by a series of binary variables that indicate whether the pair of 
countries in question shares a language, a colonial relationship or a land border). Also 
included among the ti variables are indicators of the previous proportion of immigrants of 
the nationality of the country of origin, as this variable has been proven to be of help in 
predicting the direction and intensity of migratory flows.7
The gravity equation is estimated for bilateral migrations from 2000 to 2010, with data 
drawn from the World Bank’s GBM database. Subsequently, the values of the estimated 
parameters are used to project changes in future migration rates to 2050, based on the 
United Nations projections of the future course of the demographic variable (go – gd) for the 
native population. The projections thus obtained refer to the net change in the number of 
migrants in each decade to 2050, and from these changes the total number of migrants 
per country at the end of each decade is inferred. 
As earlier indicated, the methodology used is based on the existing relationship between 
migration and demographic pressures, but it should be borne in mind that international 
migration is also influenced by socio-economic factors, migratory policies, wars and 
natural disasters, inter alia. This is why the findings of this article should not be interpreted 
as predictions, but as the best possible projections obtained on the basis of a restricted 
set of variables, with the aim of providing results for the broadest possible set of countries.8 
Before analysing the migration projections, it is worth reviewing current migration patterns. 
Table 1 details the 25 countries with the largest numbers of immigrants, based on World 
Bank data for 2010. The United States stands out as the country with the highest number 
of immigrants: its more than 40 million immigrants account for 20.7% of total global 
migrants and for 13% of the US population. Significantly, of the first 25 countries of 
destination of immigration, only nine are advanced countries and 14 developing nations, 
which demonstrates that international migration is not targeted exclusively on the 
developed countries. 
Table 2 sets out the main countries of origin of international migration. Mexico is the 
leading global source of migrants, with 11.9 million migrants. This figure is equivalent to 
10% of Mexico’s resident population in 2010 and comprises 6.1% of the total international 
migrants recorded by the World Bank. Most of these emigrants (11.6 million) live in the 
United States. Among the first 25 countries of origin of migration, developing countries are 
in the majority, although six developed countries also feature. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the projections are made with a horizon terminating in 
2050. Aggregating the global-level information, the projection of the total number of migrants 
globally is expected to increase from 190 million people in 2010 to 334 million in 2050 (see 
Chart 1). In relative terms, that entails a progressive increase from 2.8% of the world 
population in 2010 to 2.9% in 2020, 3.1% in 2030, 3.3% in 2040 and up to 3.5% in 2050. 
The origin of these migrants is shown in Chart 2. The left-hand panel shows the absolute 
number of emigrants while the right-hand panel gives the percentage accounted for by 
projections 
7  See McKenzie and Rapoport (2007), Beine, Docquier and Özden (2011) and Docquier, Peri and Ruyssen (2014).
8  In future extensions to this paper, an attempt could be made to broaden the methodology to include changes in 
migratory policies, especially in the countries of destination. If changes are observed in these variables in the 
2000-2010 decade, the methodology allows for the inclusion of these additional variables as regressors in the 
equation being estimated. Another extension to this paper is to use different demographic growth scenarios and 
to compare their effects on international migration. 
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these emigrants in the population of origin. For those countries in which the emigration 
rate is close to 10% (such as Mexico and the former Soviet republics), the projections do 
not involve a significant increase in that rate. Indeed, for the Eastern European countries 
the emigration rate falls to below 8% in 2050. However, for sub-Saharan Africa and India 
the projection entails increases in the emigration rate, albeit to still-low rates in 2050, 
since the starting point is at very low levels. Even so, these two regions undergo strong 
increases in their emigration in absolute numbers, owing to their strong population growth 
figures. On the projections obtained, emigrants from sub-Saharan Africa would rise from 
19 million people in 2010 to 78 million in 2050; the rise in emigrants from India would be 
from 11 million to over 40 million in 2050. 
According to the projections, emigration from Middle East and North African countries (MENA) 
would fall to 2020, rising in the subsequent years; that from Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC), excluding Mexico, would also increase as from 2020. Mexican emigrants would rise 
from close to 12 million in 2010 to 18 million in 2050, while those from the rest of Latin 
America would climb by 50% over that period, from almost 20 million to 30 million in 2050. 
The projections indicate that the United States would continue to be the country with the 
largest number of immigrants in 2050 (see Chart 3), with the figure rising from 40.2 million 
SOURCE: Own calculations on basis of World Bank data.
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DESTINATION OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: MAIN COUNTRIES (2010) TABLE 1
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SOURCE: Own calculations based on World Bank.
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in 2010 to 58.6 million in 2050. However, continental Europe would receive the largest 
inflow of migrants among developed countries. The number of immigrants in the four 
biggest continental European economies (Germany, Spain, France and Italy) would rise 
from 27.7 million in 2010 to 56.5 million in 2050, a figure only slightly lower than that of the 
United States. The number of immigrants in continental Europe grows strongly in the 
projections because of Europe’s relative geographical proximity to the African countries 
with high demographic growth rates. 
These results for Europe should, however, be qualified in two respects. Firstly, the 
projection is surely overestimated for countries that posted temporarily high migration 
growth between 2000 and 2010, as might be the case of Spain. The years taken to estimate 
the equation are for the 2000-2010 period, in which Spain attracted an unparalleled 
number of immigrants compared with the previous decades or in the years to date in the 
following decade, meaning that the estimated parameters place Spain as an atypically 
attractive migration destination, giving rise to an overly high projection for the years 2020-
2050. The second caveat, operating in the opposite direction, is that from 2000 to 2010 the 
SOURCE: Own calculations.
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migratory waves of refugees from conflict zones in North Africa and the Middle East had 
not yet peaked, meaning that the projections for some countries, such as Germany, no 
doubt underestimate the real number of immigrants in 2020, the first year of the projection, 
and in the following years.9 Moreover, in the case of the United Kingdom, its exit from the 
EU and the possibility that Brexit may affect the free-movement regime might alter 
migratory flows between European countries. 
The case of the United States is of particular importance owing to the fact that its 
migratory policies are adopting a restrictive bias, probably as a reaction to the growing 
discontent of voters, who in many cases have a warped perception of the true economic 
effects of the immigration phenomenon. The projections by Hanson and McIntosh (2016) 
predicted that the number of immigrants would flatten out at the current level as 
demographic growth in Latin America – the main region of origin of migration towards the 
United States – slowed, with the demographic pressures that push migrants out towards 
the United States thereby weakening. This fact remains present in the estimates obtained 
in this paper, but the results indicate that the United States will be exposed to strong 
migratory pressures from Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, which the aforementioned authors 
did not detect with the use of their database. 
Chart 4 depicts the projections for immigrants for a set of developing countries. The panel 
shows the biggest countries of destination of immigration in different regions of the world. 
Chart 4.1 shows three former Soviet republics that have a large number of immigrants: Russia, 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan. One characteristic of these republics is that there are strong cross-
migratory links. For example, according to World Bank data, in 2010 there were 3.7 million 
Ukrainian citizens living in Russia whereas the number of Russian citizens in Ukraine totalled 
3.6 million. Likewise, that same year there were 2.2 million Kazakhs resident in Russia and 
2.6 million Russians in Kazakhstan. The projections indicate that the number of immigrants in 
Russia and Ukraine will remain constant, while in Kazakhstan it will increase. In the three 
countries, the demographic growth outlook is similar, meaning that major additional flows to 
the current strong cross-presence are not projected. In the case of Kazakhstan, the greater 
proximity to countries with higher demographic growth entails greater immigration pressures. 
Strong economic growth also acts as a magnet in this country. 
Chart 4.2 features a selection of Asian countries. According to the projections, the number 
of immigrants will increase in all these countries, with the exception of India. This is 
because the United Nations forecast high demographic growth rates in India and, therefore, 
this means that this country is less attractive to foreign migrants. Widespread increases 
are observed in the number of immigrants for African countries (see Chart 4.3). Sub-
Saharan Africa is the region with the highest projected birth rates and there is some 
divergence across the region’s countries. That gives rise to large migratory flows across 
the region’s countries in the projections. It is important too to mention the strong growth in 
immigration into the South African Republic from 2000 to 2010, which might bring about 
an overestimation of future migration, as discussed in the case of Spain. 
Finally, Chart 4.4 features the main countries of destination of Latin America. For Argentina, 
the projections indicate a progressive reduction in the number of immigrants, reflecting a 
reduction in birth rates in the countries that were traditionally the origin of immigrants, and 
9  The problems referred to are not easy to solve with this methodology. The usefulness of the methodology used 
here resides in its relatively easy application to a large number of countries, many of them developing countries, 
for which it is difficult to obtain reliable projections in any other way.
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a poorer Argentine per capita GDP performance in relative terms. For Brazil, a change in 
trend is projected: as from 2020, the number of immigrants is expected to begin to grow, 
breaking the previous declining trend, due partly to the reduction in Brazilian demographic 
growth rates. In the case of Mexico, the transition towards lower population growth rates, 
and the growth of its per capita GDP, will transform this country into a significant recipient 
of migrants, especially from Central America. 
This article has described the international migration projections obtained through a new 
methodology, which enables projections to be made for all pairs of countries in the world 
using a very small set of explanatory variables. The demographic variables required can be 
readily obtained from the United Nations projections. This is an advantage, especially in 
the case of developing countries, for which statistical information is not so abundant. The 
potential uses of this methodology include the preparation of migration and population 
scenarios, which can feed into projections of long-term potential output growth. 
The methodology used is based on the existing relationship between migration and 
demographic pressures; it does not incorporate changes in migratory policies and is not 
capable of anticipating events such as conflicts or natural disasters, which might alter the 
results of the projection. The projection exercise suggests that migratory flows towards 
the United States will hold up and that there will be a bigger influx of immigrants into 
continental Europe. Among the emerging countries, Mexico is expected to become a 
destination for immigration, while continuing to be a major source of emigrants. According 
to the projections, the increase in the number of migrants globally will stem from India 
and from sub-Saharan Africa, where high demographic growth rates are forecast in the 
coming decades. 
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